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CHAPTER 9

False Convictions
PHOEBE ELLSWORTH
SAM GROSS

False convictions have received a lot of attention in
recent years. Two-hundred and forty-one prisoners
have been released after DNA testing has proved their
innocence, and hundreds of others have been released
without DNA evidence. We now know quite a bit
more about false convictions than we did thirty years
ago-but there is much more that we do not know,
and may never know.

Background
False Convictions and Exonerations

Conceptually, convicting an innocent person is a
misclassification, an error caused by the difficulty of
evaluating uncertain evidence about a past event. Few
misclassifications, however, are as troubling. A false
conviction may destroy the life of the innocent de
fendant and deeply damage the lives of those close
to him. He is punished as cruelly as the worst among
us, by the state, in public. He is deprived of the life
he once led and labeled a criminal, perhaps a vicious
predator. He knows that he is innocent; he tells the
truth to the authorities, but they ignore him. And in
the process they usually make another mistake: they
fail to pursue the real criminal.
Historically, the dominant reaction to this problem
has been denial. Judge Learned Hand expressed this
view memorably in 1923: "Our [criminal] procedure
has always been haunted by the ghost of the innocent
man convicted. It is an unreal dream" ( United States
v. Garsson, 1923). Judge Hand, of course, knew that
innocent people are sometimes convicted; his claim
was that it is so extremely rare that the risk should not
affect public policy. We still hear echoes of that view,
but they are increasingly unconvincing.
The fundamental problem with false convictions is
that they are extraordinarily hard to detect. By defini
tion, we do not know when a conviction is wrong,

or we would not make the error in the first place: if
we had a general test for innocence, we would use it
at trial. The same ignorance that causes false convic
tions makes them exceedingly difficult to study. The
only ones we know about are exonerations, those rare
cases in which a convicted criminal defendant is able
to prove his innocence after the fact.
A handful of such cases were known when Judge
Hand wrote in 1923. Nine years later, Edwin Bor
chard published Convicting the Innocent, his clas
sic collection of 65 exonerations dating back to the
nineteenth century ( Borchard, 1932). In the decades
that followed several similar collections were released
(Frank and Frank, 1957; Gardner, 1952; Gross, 1987;
Radin, 1964), culminating in Radelet and Bedau's
compilation of 417 cases of American defendants
who had been convicted of homicide or of other capi
tal crimes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
( Bedau and Radelet, 1987; Radelet, Bedau, and Put
nam, 1992).
In the meantime, the rate of exonerations increased
sharply, first in the mid-1970s, when the death penalty
came back into use in the United States after a judicial
hiatus (Furman v. Georgia, 1972; Gregg v. Georgia,
1976), and then again in 1989 when the first DNA
exonerations occurred. As a result, there have been
hundreds of exonerations in the United States in the
past few decades. They have changed our view of the
nature of the problem of false conviction and have had
a substantial impact on the criminal justice system.
We focus on these recent exonerations, which fall
into four sets:
•

In January 1989, David Vasquez became the first
of 241 American defendants to date to be exoner
ated by DNA evidence (Conners et al., 1996;
Innocence Project, 2009).1 Almost all of these
exonerations involve rape, although in some cases
the defendant was also convicted of another crime,
usually murder.
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Since 1973, 135 defendants who were sentenced
to death for murder have been exonerated and
released. DNA evidence played a substantial role
in 17 of these death-row exonerations ( Death
Penalty Information Center, 2009).
From 1989 through 2003, at least 135 American
defendants who were convicted of felonies but
not sentenced to death were exonerated without
the benefit of DNA evidence. Unlike the DNA
and death-row exonerations, there is no authori
tative list of such cases. The vast majority were
from convictions for murder (78%) or rape (12%)
( Gross et al., 2005).
In the past ten years, between 140 and 200 in
nocent defendants were released in mass exonera
tions when three major police scandals came to
light: two in Texas, in 2002 and 2003, and one
in Los Angeles, in 1999. In each of these sets of
cases, police officers were caught systematically
framing innocent defendants for possession of il
legal drugs or weapons (Gross, 2008) .2

There have been other exonerations since 1973, but
these four groups include the great majority of those
that have been described in publicly available sys
tematic collections. It is a small set of observations,
perhaps 650 to 700 exonerations across the whole
country over a 35-year period. It is not much to go
on, but it is a lot more information than we had in
1990.
Before we proceed to what we have learned from
these several hundred exonerations, we should say a
few words about what we do not know.
First, since there is no test for the actual innocence
of convicted defendants, we rely on a proxy: the ac
tions of government officials when claims of inno
cence are raised. As we use the term, exoneration is
an official act-a pardon, a dismissal or an acquittal
declaring a defendant not guilty of a crime for which
he or she had been convicted, because new evidence
of innocence that was not presented at trial required
reconsideration of the case ( Gross et al., 2005).
Some exonerated defendants are no doubt guilty
of the crimes for which they were convicted, in whole
or in part, but the number is probably very small. It
is extremely difficult to obtain this sort of relief after
a criminal conviction in America, and it usually re
quires overwhelming evidence. On the other hand, it
is clear that countless false convictions are never dis
covered. That is true for entire categories of cases, as
we will see, and even among cases where exonerations
do sometimes occur, they frequently depend on blind
luck.3
Second, we know next to nothing about false con
victions for any crimes except rape and murder. These

two crimes-the most serious violent felonies
account for only 2% of felony convictions (and a much
smaller proportion of all criminal convictions), but
95% of exonerations. The main reason is simple. Since
almost all exonerations require large investments of
scarce resources, they are only actively pursued in the
most serious of cases. The 340 defendants who were
exonerated and released from 1989 through 2003
spent, on average, more than 10 years in prison. Most
had been sentenced to death or life imprisonment,
and more than three-quarters to at least 25 years in
prison (Gross et al., 2005). By comparison, 30% of all
convicted felons in 2004 were not incarcerated at all,
and the average term for those who were was just over
3 years ( Durose and Langan, 2007).
The disproportionate attention to the most extreme
cases explains the comparatively high number of ex
onerations among murder convictions, and especially
death sentences. For rape, of course, the availability
of DNA evidence has made exonerations much more
accessible and common than for other serious violent
felonies, for example, armed robbery. Even so, rape
exonerations generally occur in the cases with the most
severe sentences. Of 121 rape defendants exonerated
from 1989 through 2003, over 30% were sentenced
to life imprisonment, and the median sentence for the
remainder was 30 years; for all defendants convicted of
rape in 2000, 10% received probation, and the median
sentence for the rest was 7 years (Gross, 2008).
What mistaken convictions have we left out? Of
course we do not know, but we can make some edu
cated guesses. For example, the number of wrongful
convictions for robbery must be far greater than the
few that have been discovered. Almost all wrongful
convictions in rape cases involve eyewitness misiden
tifications, which are largely limited to cases in which
the criminal is a stranger to the victim, but robberies
by strangers outnumber rapes by strangers by a factor
of 10 or more ( Gross et al., 2005). In a study con
ducted before the advent of DNA testing, most of the
comparatively few eyewitness misidentification cases
that led to exonerations were robberies, not rapes
( Gross, 1987). It stands to reason that false convic
tions for robbery still outnumber those for rape, but
very few of them show up among the exonerations
because there is no definitive evidence of innocence
that is comparable to DNA.
Base rates suggest that most false convictions prob
ably occur among the two overlapping groups that
dominate all criminal convictions: ( 1) Comparatively
light sentences, typically for comparatively minor
charges. As we have seen, such cases are all but entirely
missing from exonerations. (2) Guilty pleas. Over 95%
of criminal convictions in America are based on guilty
pleas, usually as a result of plea bargains-but only
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about 6% of exonerations are of defendants who pied
guilty, and they are more similar to other exonerations
than to guilty pleas in general. The average sentence
for 20 defendants who pied guilty and were later exon
erated between 1989 and 2003 was 46 years in prison,
which is not surprising given that all but one were
charged with rape or murder and all faced the death
penalty or life imprisonment (Gross et al., 2005).
Here again, we have scraps of relevant informa
tion, enough to disprove the common belief that
innocent defendants virtually never plead guilty to
crimes they did not commit (Hoffman, 2007). We
know about false convictions for illegal possession of
drugs and guns in the context of the mass exonera
tions that followed the discoveries of three systematic
schemes by police officers to frame innocent defen
dants. Most of these defendants pied guilty in return
for sentences far lighter than those that might warrant
the cost and work that are usually required to have
a chance at an individual exoneration ( Gross, 2008).
But how often do innocent defendants plead guilty in
order to receive light sentences in other, more com
mon contexts? And in what sorts of cases? We don't
have a clue.
The Frequency of False Convictions

recently as 2007, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote
in a concurring opinion in the Supreme Court that
American criminal convictions have an "error rate
of .027 percent-or, to put it another way, a success
rate of 99.973 percent" (Kansas v. Marsh, 2006). A
highly comforting assessment, if true-but of course,
it is absurd. The error was derived by taking the num
ber of exonerations we know about-almost all of
which occur in a tiny minority of murders and aggra
vated rapes-and dividing it by the total of all felony
convictions, from drug possession and burglary to car
theft and income-tax evasion. To actually estimate the
proportion of erroneous convictions, we need a well
defined group of cases within which we can identify
all mistaken convictions, or at least a substantial pro
portion of them. It is hard to imagine how that might
be done for criminal conviction generally; however, it
may be possible to do so, at least roughly, for the two
types of crimes for which exonerations are compara
tively common: rape and capital murder.4
For rape, there are some systematic data ( not
yet analyzed) on false convictions. In Virginia, the
Department of Forensic Science has discovered hun
dreds of files on rape cases from the 1970s and 1980s
with untested biological evidence that could be used
to obtain DNA profiles of the rapists. A careful study
of this DNA archive, or of similar sets of files else
where, could produce a good estimate of the rate of
AB
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false convictions for rape in that jurisdiction for the
decade or so before pretrial DNA testing became rou
tine. So far, all we have are the results of a preliminary
run in Virginia: 2 false convictions out of 22 cases, or
9% of that tiny sample (Liptak, 2008).
Capital murder is different. It stands out from
other crimes not because of any special evidentiary
advantage in determining whether convictions were
in error, but because far more attention and resources
are devoted to death-penalty cases, before and after
conviction. AB a result, death sentences, which repre
sent less than one-tenth of 1% of prison sentences, ac
counted for about 22% of the exonerations from 1979
through 2003, a disproportion of more than 250 to 1
( Gross and O'Brien, 2008). This suggests that a sub
stantial proportion of innocent defendants who are
sentenced to death are ultimately exonerated, perhaps
a majority. If so, the rate of capital exoneration can
be used as a lower bound for the rate of false con
viction among death sentences. Gross and O'Brien
( 2008) calculated that 2.3% of all death sentences in
the United States from 1973 through 1989 ended
in exoneration ( 86/3792), and Risinger ( 2007) esti
mated that 3.3% of the defendants sentenced to death
for rape murders from 1982 through 1989 were ex
onerated by DNA evidence; but as the researchers
note, even among death sentences, the true propor
tion of false convictions must be higher than the ob
served proportion of exonerations, perhaps consider
ably higher. 5
Can we generalize from the false-conviction rate
for death sentences? One might suppose that the
error rate for other crimes is likely to be at least as
high, considering that fewer resources are devoted to
less serious cases. On the other hand, Gross (1998)
argued that the error rate for murder in general, and
capital murder in particular, is likely to be greater than
for other felonies because the authorities are under
enormous pressure to solve these heinous crimes. As
a result they sometimes pursue weak cases that would
otherwise be dropped, cut corners, or rely on ques
tionable evidence. Unfortunately, there are no data
on this point one way or the other. What we do know
is that among the most serious criminal convictions of
all-deatl1 sentences-miscarriages of justice are, at a
minimum, an uncommon but regular occurrence, like
death from diabetes ( 3.1% of all deaths in the United
States) or Alzheimer's disease ( 2.8%) (Heron, 2007).
Causes and Predictors of False Convictions

Several evidentiary and procedural factors recur among
exonerations: eyewitness misidentification, false con
fession, fraud and error on the part of forensic analysts,
perjury by jailhouse informants and other witnesses
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who testify in exchange for substantial favors, miscon
duct by police and prosecutors, and incompetent rep
resentation by criminal defense attorneys. All of these
factors have been examined by social scientists and
legal researchers, some extensively.
Eyewitness error is the most common cause of
false convictions. It occurs in most known cases ( Gar
rett, 2008; Gross et al., 2005), and it is the one most
thoroughly researched. Many factors that can mini
mize the likelihood of eyewitness error are within
the control of the police ( system variables, as Wells
called them [1978]): obtaining an immediate detailed
description of the suspect from the witness; careful
choice of lineup members; instructions that caution
the witness that the true culprit may not be in the
lineup; presentation of the lineup by a person who
does not know who the actual suspect is; carefully
recording the content and timing of all communica
tions between the police and the witness; and scrupu
lous refusal to communicate any information about
the suspect to the witness. Laboratory studies have
demonstrated that all of these factors and others can
affect the testimony of the witness and the chances
of misidentification (cf. Steblay and Loftus, this vol
ume). Case studies confirm that these are the most
common causes of error in false convictions that have
come to light (e.g., McGonigle and Emily, 2008).
Approximately 250 false confessions have been re
ported since the late 1980s (Leo, 2008), and Garrett
( 2008) reported that they occurred in 15% of the cases
of prisoners exonerated by DNA evidence. A series of
laboratory studies by Saul Kassin demonstrates that
ordinary people can be induced to confess to wrong
doing much more easily than is commonly believed,
that tactics often used in police interrogations ( such as
lying about incriminating evidence) can increase the
likelihood of false confessions, and that trained police
investigators are not very good at distinguishing true
confessions from false ones ( Kassin, 2005). There is
strong evidence from actual cases that suspects who
are young or mentally impaired are particularly vul
nerable to suggestive police tactics that encourage
false confessions (Leo, 2009). Although the empirical
record on false confessions is less extensive than it is
for eyewitness misidentification, we know a good deal
about the kinds of tactics that elicit false confessions,
( Kassin, 2008), and prohibiting these tactics would
certainly reduce their frequency.
Forensic error ( Garrett and Neufeld, 2009), per
jury by informants (Warden, 2004), and prosecuto
rial (Armstrong and Possley, 1999) and ineffective
defense work (Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer, 2003)
are not so subject to controlled experimentation but
have frequently been found in cases of actual false
convictions. Some of these problems are caused by
overtaxed resources and heavy caseloads and might

be solved by spending more money. But not all. For
example, forensic labs that are run by police depart
ments are less likely to conduct unbiased analyses than
fully independent labs no matter how well funded.
And prosecutorial misconduct that leads to newswor
thy convictions is unlikely to be punished.
There is no doubt that all these factors contrib
ute to many, probably most, false convictions. Most
innocent defendants who were misidentified; for
example, would not have been convicted if no eye
witness had identified them. But information from
exonerations alone is limited, even when it is rein
forced by the results of controlled experimental stud
ies. Experimental studies have identified factors that
lead to evidentiary mistakes (misidentifications, false
confessions), and these mistakes frequently occur in
known false convictions (e.g., Scheck, Neufeld, and
Dwyer, 2003). But experimental studies cannot tell
us which mistakes are most important for false convic
tions because they do not measure false convictions.
It appears, for example, that many-probably most
misidentifications (Gross, 1987) and false confessions
( Drizin and Leo, 2004) do not lead to the conviction
of innocent people. To really understand the signifi
cance of these factors we need to know more about
the investigatory and adjudicative processes that pro
duce false convictions.
First, we only know about the causes of those false
convictions that we know about. As we have seen,
that means that any generalizations we mal<e are ef
fectively limited to rape and murder cases that go to
trial. For example, some defendants who cannot af
ford to post bail are offered the choice of taking plea
bargains and going home on probation or insisting on
their innocence and remaining in jail. That dilemma
may be a major cause of false convictions for innocent
defendants who plead guilty ( see, e.g., PBS, 2004, the
Erma Faye Stewart case), but we have no data with
which to test that hypothesis. And the false convic
tions that are produced by this process may involve
the same evidentiary and procedural factors we have
discussed-or they may not: many of these cases are
decided on slight evidence with little procedure.
Second, the occurrence of one of these causal ele
ments is rarely a sufficient description of the process
that led to a wrongful conviction. For example, when
an innocent defendant falsely confesses after 20 hours
of intensive interrogation, we must ask, Why did the
police believe he was guilty and invest so much time in
wringing a confession out of him? And why did they
trust a confession obtained under these circumstances?
Third, while these factors are causes of false con
viction, they are not predictors. For example, eyewit
ness misidentification appears to be the most com
mon cause of wrongful rape convictions, occurring in
nearly 90% of rape exonerations. But what does that
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really tell us? With a handful of exceptions, all rape
exonerations so far have occurred in cases in which
there was no pretrial DNA testing. In these cases, the
victim was expected to identify the defendant, unless
it was physically impossible because it was dark or her
face was covered. If she failed to do so, the case usu
ally fizzled. In other words, before DNA evidence,
an eyewitness identification was all but essential for a
rape case to be prosecuted at all. If all rape convictions
involve eyewitness identification, then all rape exon
erations necessarily involve misidentification. But if
we can only infer the misidentification on the basis of
the exoneration, the misidentification could not have
been used as a predictor of innocence.
What about police procedures that might cause an
eyewitness to pick the wrong person? Experimental
studies demonstrate that misidentifications can easily
be caused by suggestive identification procedures: a
police officer who knows which of the subjects in a
lineup is the real suspect may intentionally or uninten
tionally make that person salient to the witness in sub
tle or obvious ways; or a witness may be called to the
police station and shown a person in handcuffs who
vaguely resembles that witness's description of the
criminal; or a witness who repeatedly fails to identify
the suspect's picture in different photographic lineups
may eventually pick him because of a cumulative sense
of familiarity ( Steblay and Loftus, this volume).
But do suggestive identification procedures predict
false convictions? That is not so clear. Suggestive tac
tics may be pervasive, whereas false convictions are
rare. For all we know, suggestive tactics are used just
as often in accurate identifications as in mistaken iden
tifications. We know from experimental research that
suggestive tactics increase the number of mistaken
identifications, but suggestive identification tech
niques can also lead to true convictions. They may
be as likely to provide the impetus that motivates an
irresolute witness to declare an accurate choice as they
are to produce an inaccurate one.
The same logic applies to other common eviden
tiary causes of false convictions. For example, as with
misidentification, we know that a confession is false
only after the fact, when other evidence has estab
lished the defendant's innocence. And as with sugges
tive identification procedures, prolonged and gruel
ing interrogation-or controversial techniques, such
as falsely telling the suspect that there is incriminating
eyewitness or fingerprint evidence, or suggesting that
the reason he has no memory of the crime is that he
may have blacked out-might be as likely or more
likely to elicit confessions from guilty suspects as from
innocent ones.
To identify actual predictors of false conviction we
need information about factors that can be observed
in advance, before we know whether a conviction is
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true or false. And we need that information not only
for exonerations but also for some comparable set of
true convictions as well. For the most part, such data
do not exist, but a few patterns are clear enough to
be apparent from comparisons between data on exon
erations and statistics on rape and murder convictions
in general. ( 1) Innocent African American men are
more likely to be falsely convicted of rape than inno
cent white men, especially if the victim is white, prob
ably because white Americans are much more likely
to mistake one African American stranger for another
than to confuse members of their own race (Meissner
and Brigham, 2001). (2) Innocent teenagers accused
of murder are more likely to falsely confess than are
innocent adults. ( 3) Minority juveniles are more likely
than white juveniles to be falsely convicted of rape or
murder ( Gross et al., 2005).
For death sentences, it is possible to make direct
comparisons between true and false convictions be
cause the available records ( while far from perfect) are
much more complete than for other criminal convic
tions. Gross and O'Brien ( 2008) compared death
row exonerations to a sample of executed capital de
fendants, with the assumption that almost all of those
who were executed were guilty. They found that false
capital convictions are more likely ( 4) if the defendant
had little or no prior criminal record, ( 5) if the defen
dant did not confess, and ( 6) if the police investiga
tion took a long time.

Social and Institutional Context
Overview

The common image of a false conviction is derived
from the murder and rape exonerations that we know
about: after a difficult and troubled investigation, an
innocent defendant is convicted at trial for a heinous
crime of violence and sentenced to death or life in
prison. There is every reason to believe that few false
convictions bear any resemblance to this picture.
Ninety-eight percent of felony convictions, and a
larger proportion of all criminal convictions, are for
lesser crimes, mostly property crimes, drug crimes,
and assaults. Ninety-five percent of felony convictions
are based on guilty pleas, usually after perfunctory in
vestigations. In that mundane context, false convic
tions are not dramatic errors caused by recklessness
or serious misconduct but rather are commonplace
events: inconspicuous mistakes in routine criminal
cases that never get anything close to the level of at
tention that sometimes leads to exonerations.
What is more, even the most disturbing false con
victions may have ordinary histories (Lofquist, 2001).
Consider the case of Antonio Beaver. In 1996 a white
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woman was the victim of a carjacking in St. Louis
( Innocence Project, 2009). She described the crimi
nal as a black man wearing a baseball cap with a gap
between his front teeth and helped the policed draw a
composite sketch. Beaver was picked up a week later
because he resembled the composite: he had chipped
teeth. He was placed in a lineup with three other men,
where he was one of two men in the lineup wear
ing a baseball cap and the only one with visible den
tal defects. He was picked by the victim, convicted
at trial-even though his fingerprints did not match
those on the rear view mirror of the victim's car-and
sentenced to 18 years in prison. Beaver was exoner
ated by DNA in 2007, after serving more than 10
years, because the victim wounded the real criminal
with a screwdriver and he bled on the car seat. The
actual robber was identified by his DNA and finger
prints; he was serving time for other crimes.
We tend to think that causes should be propor
tional to their consequences (Ross and Nisbett,
1991), so when a terrible disaster strikes, we search
for a cause as dramatic as the tragedy that followed.
That instinct is often false. After the Challenger space
shuttle exploded in 1986, the official investigation
concluded that the immediate cause was a decision by
NASA managers-under bureaucratic and budgetary
pressure-to proceed with the launch and override
warnings from engineers of a potentially catastrophic
risk. But as Vaughan ( 1996) demonstrated, there was
nothing unusual about the launch decision. The man
agers decided to carry on in the face of a known dan
ger, with the concurrence of the engineers, as they
had on many other occasions. They broke no rules
and followed the established practices of an organiza
tion in which it was common to classify some risks
as "acceptable." Similar patterns of routine behavior
may cause most false convictions, big and small.
This sort of everyday behavior was probably be
hind Antonio Beaver's tragedy. The lineup was ob
viously biased, but casual and suggestive lineups are
common, perhaps the rule. Most likely, they only in
frequently lead to false convictions. In many, if not
most, cases the police do have the right guy; if they
do not, the witness may not pick the innocent suspect
despite the suggestive procedure, or the real criminal
may turn up with the victim's wallet in his pocket, or
the false suspect may have an iron-dad alibi (e.g., he
was in jail at the time of the crime). In Beaver's case,
the police ignored physical evidence from the scene
fingerprints from an unidentified person and DNA
that was not tested for a decade-but that, too, is
commonplace and usually harmless. The upshot was a
case that drew no attention: a black man who claimed
to be innocent was convicted of aggravated robbery
on the basis of a single cross-racial identification at

an imperfect lineup. Most such defendants are guilty,
and when they are not, we almost never find out.
Beaver lucked out: the real robber bled on the car
seat, the car was recovered, and a blood swab was col
lected and preserved.
We are not suggesting that nothing can be done
about false convictions. Common practices can and
often should be changed. But there are costs, and
choosing the most effective reforms is not easy, es
pecially when there is so little information about the
underlying problem.
The Structure of Criminal Investigation and
Adjudication

Criminal cases in America proceed through several
stages.
IDENTIFYING THE CRIMINAL

The first task in any criminal investigation is to iden
tify the criminal. This can take any amount of time
or none at all. At one extreme, identification may be
instantaneous (as when a killer reports a homicide and
confesses) or it may precede the crime: in a sting, for
example, the suspect is identified before the crime is
committed. At the other end of the continuum, some
criminals-like the notorious Zodiac Killer, who ter
rorized northern California in the late 1960s-are
never identified. However long it takes, at this stage
the authorities are still trying to answer the question,
Who did it? The answer, whenever it comes, marks a
fundamental shift in focus: from an investigation of
the crime to the pursuit and prosecution of the sus
pect; from figuring out what happened to building a
case against the person who they believe did it.
ARREST AND CHARGING

Once the criminal is identified he must be appre
hended and arrested. This usually happens soon after
identification, but occasionally a suspect may remain
at large for a long time, or forever. Arrest triggers
another set of changes. Typically, this is the point at
which a prosecutor first learns about the crime. (In
a minority of cases prosecutors are involved earlier,
either because the crime is unusually conspicuous or
because the arrest is the product of a proactive in
vestigation rather than an after-the-fact response to a
reported crime.) The prosecutor decides what charges
to file, if any, and presents them in court, at which
point the formal process of American criminal litiga
tion begins. The case becomes a lawsuit with the pros
ecutor as plaintiff and the suspect as defendant. The
defendant appears in court and hears the charges; he
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may be released pending trial, or he may be detained,
usually because he cannot afford to post bail; and he
gets a lawyer to defend him, usually an appointed law
yer paid by the state. The adversarial structure is now
complete.
PRETRIAL SORTING

The next stage of criminal proceedings is often called
pretrial bargaining, but that is misleading. It sug
gests that trial is the expected mode of resolving a
criminal case, which is false. For example, of defen
dants charged with felonies in 2002 in the 75 largest
American counties, only 4% went to trial whereas 65%
pled guilty, overwhelmingly to felonies ( Cohen and
Reeves, 2006). Overall, about 95% of all felony con
victions in the United States are obtained by guilty
pleas, usually as a result of plea bargaining between
defense attorneys and prosecutors; in 2002 the pro
portion of guilty pleas for state-court felonies ranged
from 68% of murder convictions to 98% of drug pos
session convictions (Durose and Langan, 2004). In
some unknown proportion of these guilty pleas, the
defendants are innocent.
Plea bargains are not the only cases that end be
fore trial. Nearly a quarter of all felony cases are dis
missed by prosecutors, usually because they do not
have enough evidence to get convictions in court
( Durose and Langan, 2003). Some of these dismissals
(again, we do not know how many) happen to benefit
innocent defendants. In other cases, the charges are
dropped before trial because of affirmative evidence
of innocence. Judging from two studies that focus on
specific causes of false convictions, an innocent defen
dant who is arrested is more likely to be discovered
and let go before trial than to be acquitted at trial or
exonerated after conviction. Gross (1987) collected
data on 60 misidentification cases in the United States
from 1967 through 1983; in 35 cases, the charges
were dismissed before trial, and in 25, the defendants
were exonerated after conviction at trial; there were
no acquittals. And Drizin and Leo ( 2004) reported on
125 suspects who falsely confessed to felonies (over
whelmingly to murder) between 1971 and 2002: 10
were arrested but never charged, 64 had their charges
dismissed before trial, 7 were acquitted at trial, and 44
were exonerated after conviction.
TRIAL

Trials are uncommon among criminal cases in America
but are heavily overrepresented among exonerations:
they account for about 5% of felony convictions but
94% of the exonerations we know about, a dispropor
tion of more than 350 to 1. Trials are more frequent
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for the crimes that account for the great majority of
exonerations-murder ( 32%) and rape (16%) ( Durose
and Langan, 2004)-but those charges may be more
likely to produce exonerations in part because they
are more likely to go to trial. The common image of
an American criminal trial includes a jury, but about
60% are conducted by judges sitting alone. Either
way, 80%-90% of felony defendants who go to trial
are convicted.
Trial, of course, is a highly formal and adversarial
affair. It is a show run by lawyers, and in criminal
cases the dominant lawyer is the prosecutor, the of
ficial who represents the state, decides whether to file
charges and for what crime, makes the plea offer that
usually determines whether a case goes to trial or ends
in a plea bargain, and, if a case does go to trial, pre
sents the evidence gathered by the police. A prosecu
tor is legally and ethically bound to "seek justice," and
in particular to avoid convicting the innocent, but her
main role at trial is more concrete. Like the defense
attorney (who has no general obligation to the cause
of justice), she is an advocate whose goal is to win.
Both sides are expected to follow the rules of ethics
and procedure, but within those forgiving limits, their
job is to present evidence and argument and to un
dercut their opponents' evidence in whatever manner
seems most likely to succeed.
REVIEW

After trial, a convicted defendant may appeal, but the
review he will get is limited. The basic form of review,
direct appeal, is generally restricted to claims that the
lower court committed procedural error. New evi
dence may not be presented. The appellate court may
only consider evidence that was presented at trial and
may not reevaluate the factual accuracy of the judg
ment of the judge or jury. Its sole role is to decide
whether there were procedural errors at trial that were
serious enough to require trying the case over again.6
Appellate courts reach that conclusion in only a small
fraction of criminal appeals, perhaps 5%-7% ( Davis,
1982; Scalia, 2001). Despite the formal rules, there is
a wealth of anecdotal evidence that judges are more
likely to reverse a criminal conviction on "procedural"
grounds if they have doubts about the defendant's
guilt ( Davis, 1982; Mathieson and Gross, 2004), but
the effect on defendants who actually are innocent,
if any, may not be large. Garrett ( 2008) looked at a
sample of 121 noncapital DNA exonerations that had
produced written opinions on appeal at some earlier
stage of review. He found a comparatively high rever
sal rate, 9%, but it was essentially the same as the re
versal rate for a matched group of noncapital murder
and rape appeals, 10%, and, whatever the comparison,
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91% of these innocent defendants had lost their
appeals.7
Almost all exonerations occur outside the struc
ture of direct appeal. Appellate review is not designed
to deal with new evidence ( Davis, 1982), and in most
cases, the exonerating facts are discovered only years
after the appeals have run their course. At that point
the defendant may file a petition for discretionary ex
traordinary relief, asking a court to reopen his case in
light of the newly discovered evidence, or he may ask
the prosecutor to join him in such a petition and then
dismiss the charges, or he may apply to the governor
for a pardon. All of these options require substantial
resources that are rarely available, since criminal de
fendants, who are almost always poor, have no right
to appointed counsel after their direct appeal.
Obtaining relief on a claim of factual innocence is
very difficult. The structure of appellate review in our
legal culture reflects a deep reluctance to reconsider
trial-court verdicts even in the light of substantial
new evidence of error, a bias that is often justified by
reference to the high value we place on the finality
of judgments. In many cases a posttrial investigation
has so thoroughly undermined a criminal conviction
that it is clear that the defendant would be acquitted
at a new trial, but no court is willing to exercise its
discretion to reexamine the original conviction (see,
e.g., Wells and Leo, 2008, describing the notorious
Norfolk Four cases).
Other systems of appellate review may be more
forgiving. In civil-law countries on the European con
tinent the search for factual accuracy is considered
an ongoing process, from trial through appeal. New
evidence may be considered on appeal, trial witnesses
may be recalled to provide additional testimony, and
the factual conclusions of the trial court may be re
considered and revised ( Damaska, 1986). We do not
know whether this more open system of review is
more successful at identifying miscarriages of justice
at trial.8
Wrongful Convictions and the Adversary System

False accusations occur in all legal systems, and all
legal systems require some means of discovering them
and preventing them from leading to false convic
tions. From the time the police identify a person as the
criminal and make an arrest, the American criminal
justice system is adversarial. Judges have little power
to direct the investigation, call witnesses, or ask for
additional evidence if they feel that what the attorneys
have presented is ambiguous or incomplete. There
is no official comparable to the juge d,instruction in
France, whose sole task is to find the truth by search
ing for both incriminating and exculpatory evidence.

Instead, the prosecutor focuses on incriminating evi
dence, and the defense on exculpatory evidence.
Proponents of the adversary system argue that
when each side has a vested interest in finding every
scrap of evidence that favors its position, the sum of
the evidence is greater than if a single person inves
tigated the case (Fuller, 1961; Thibaut and Walker,
1975). If the case reaches trial, all of the evidence the
judge or jury hears is presented by the two adversar
ies, the prosecutor and the defense attorney. The role
of the defense attorney is relatively straightforward:
to get the best possible outcome for the client. The
prosecutor has a dual role: first to decide whether
the evidence is sufficient to charge the suspect with
the crime, and then to organize the information into
a winning case. Some scholars have argued that the
motivation to win the case may interfere with the
motivation to find the truth (Givelber, 2001; Strier,
1996). There are no useful data on rates or discov
ery of false convictions in adversarial versus nonad
versarial legal systems-doubtless both could be im
proved. But the adversary system is the one we use in
the United States, and in this section, we will describe
several of its psychological and structural features that
may undermine the successful discovery of innocent
defendants.
CONFIRMATION BIAS

When we read news stories about the exoneration of
innocent people, we are often disturbed by the flimsi
ness of the evidence that got them convicted in the
first place. A single eyewitness identifies a man, and
the case proceeds to trial and conviction even though
nine coworkers testify that he was on the job fifty
miles away, and they would be unlikely to make a mis
take since he was the only black person in the work
group and "stood out like a raisin in a bowl of rice"
(the Lenel Geter case, described in Gross, 1987). In
another case, a boy whose mother had just been mur
dered was detained for more than 24 hours and grilled
for 8 hours by interrogators who told him, falsely, that
he had failed a lie-detector test and that the reason he
had no memory of committing the crime was that he
probably blacked out; he came to think it might be
true and confessed ( Connery, 1977, the Peter Reilly
case). If the evidence in these cases looks so implau
sible to us, why did the prosecutors believe it?
In other cases, even after apparently incontrovert
ible evidence proves that the defendant could not
have committed the crime ( e.g., a time-coded video
tape shows him somewhere else; Schlup v. Dello,
1995) or a DNA match shows that the perpetrator
was someone else (Frisbie and Garrett, 2005, the case
of Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez), police
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and prosecutors continue to insist that the men they
arrested and convicted are guilty. How does this
happen?
At some point in every successful case, investiga
tors must identify a prime suspect and form a theory
of the case. When this happens, police and prosecu
tors begin to make a commitment to their theory,
and they become subject to confirmation bias-the
tendency to notice, believe, seek, and remember evi
dence consistent with their theory, while overlook
ing, doubting, forgetting, and reinterpreting evidence
to the contrary (Findley and Scott, 2006; Nickerson,
1998). Confirmation bias is not deliberate miscon
duct, nor is it the conscious preparation of an ar
gument designed to persuade a jury. It is a normal
tendency to construe the world according to one's
preconceptions, and it has been found in average citi
zens, students, doctors, accountants, and other pro
fessionals. In criminal investigations, it can lead the
investigator to interpret ambiguous evidence as con
sistent with the prime suspect's guilt, to explain away
evidence that points to someone else, and to concen
trate on the suspect when searching for additional evi
dence. "The prime suspect becomes the only suspect"
(Tavris and Aronson, 2007, p. 137). As the investiga
tion proceeds from seeking information to building a
case, it becomes possible to ignore increasingly pow
erful indications that the prime suspect is the wrong
person.
In a series of experimental studies, O'Brien ( 2009)
gave participants a lengthy police file and, after they
had reviewed the first half of the material, asked half
of them to write down the name of their prime sus
pect. The other participants were not asked to state a
hypothesis. The second half of the file included sev
eral pieces of information that raised doubts about
the guilt of the prime suspect, as well as information
that was consistent with guilt. After reading the entire
file, participants were given a chance to ask for addi
tional information. Those who had named a suspect
were more likely to ask for information focused on
that suspect rather than other possible suspects and to
interpret ambiguous or inconsistent evidence so as to
make it compatible with the suspect's guilt.
Confirmation bias affects investigators even when
their sole task is to discover the truth-doctors, scien
tists, and no doubt, juges d>instruction. But the task
of the police and prosecutor in an adversary system is
not so simple and creates contradictory demands that
exacerbate this bias. As the case proceeds from initial
investigation to trial, their task shifts from finding the
truth to building a case against the defendant that will
persuade a judge or a jury. A persuasive case requires
a coherent story (Pennington and Hastie, 1992), one
without loose ends, gaps, or inconsistencies. Thus
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inconsistencies may be explained away or considered
too trifling to communicate to the defense attorney or
the jury, loose ends may be tied up, and in some cases
gaps may be filled. Confident that they have caught
the criminal, the authorities may inadvertently exert
pressure on an eyewitness who is reluctant to make
an identification or on a lab technician who cannot
quite reach a conclusion. In the case of a suspect who
refuses to talk, this pressure may be more intentional.
O'Brien followed up her studies of confirmation
bias with a study that examined the effects of this dual
role. Some participants simply named a suspect, while
others were put in the role of prosecutors and were
told that they would later have to persuade people
that their prime suspect was in fact the criminal.
Knowing that they would have to convince others
that they were right led to an even stronger tendency
to focus exclusively on the prime suspect, to interpret
ambiguous evidence as consistent with his guilt, and
to explain away inconsistent evidence.
FALSE CLAIMS OF INNOCENCE

we have said, we do not generally know whether
a criminal defendant is guilty or innocent-with one
important qualification. In nearly every case, the de
fendant knows the truth. This private knowledge ex
plains the special status we accord to confession, which
has been called the queen of evidence. It malces it pos
sible for our system of criminal adjudication to run
almost exclusively on guilty pleas. And it means that
innocent defendants can identify themselves to the
authorities, and they do-all the time. Unfortunately,
many guilty defendants also say they are innocent.
Since we have strong reason to believe that the great
majority of criminal defendants are guilty, true claims
of innocence get lost in the crowd.
It is difficult to separate true claims of innocence
from false ones in any context, but some features of
the adversarial system make it worse. Once defense
attorneys enter the picture they stop their clients from
confessing-or from talking to the authorities at all;
they take over all communication with the state. In
that role they are expected to present their clients
as innocent, if at all possible. But everybody who
works in the system-prosecutors, police officers and
judges-knows that this is playacting, that defense at
torneys rarely believe their clients are innocent. Their
job is to obtain the best outcomes for their clients,
acquittal or dismissal if possible, even if the clients are
guilty, and they usually are. Defense attorneys who
succeed in saving "obviously guilty" clients from con
viction are considered stars by their colleagues.
But what if the defendant really is innocent? The
defense attorney, faced with dozens of spurious claims
As
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of innocence, may not be able to detect the few that
are true and rarely has the resources to conduct the
sort of investigation necessary to provide convincing
evidence. So defense attorneys frequently see their job
as getting the best deal they can for the defendant
without worrying too much about actual innocence.
PREPARATION FOR ADVERSARIAL TRIALS

We face a similar problem when it comes to present
ing evidence at trial. We require witnesses to testify
in public, in the presence of the defendant, following
strange rules of procedure. To perform this tricky and
unfamiliar role, a witness requires guidance, prepa
ration by the lawyer who calls her. Such prepping is
particularly important because her testimony includes
cross-examination by an opposing lawyer whose job
is to discredit her, whether or not she is telling the
truth. Even truthful witnesses must be taught how
to look and sound truthful; that is one of a trial at
torney's most important tasks.
Adversarial preparation may produce coherent and
convincing testimony, but it can also undercut accu
rate evaluation of the evidence at trial. A vague or un
certain witness is less persuasive than one who answers
all questions without hesitation (Wells, Lindsay, and
Ferguson, 1979); therefore, testimony is rehearsed
and confidence is bolstered, sometimes beyond what
is warranted. This process is particularly dangerous
when it begins in the early stages of the investigation.
The prosecutor and the police officers who work with
an eyewitness are expected to help the witness identify
the defendant in court with conviction and clarity. It
seems in keeping with that role for an officer to tell
a witness who has just tentatively picked the suspect
from a lineup-"Congratulations, you got him!"
but the end result may be a misleadingly confident
identification in court six months later (Wells and
Bradfield, 1998).
So far what we have described is permissible wit
ness preparation, as our system runs. But if your role
as a police detective includes helping an eyewitness
testify effectively, why not help her identify the defen
dant in the first place? It is a short step from shaping
the identification testimony that a witness will give in
court to helping that witness make the identification
in a precinct station by steering her toward the defen
dant, especially if the detective has no doubt that the
defendant is guilty but worries that the witness may
ruin the case by failing to say so.
The same logic applies to other police procedures,
such as interrogation, gathering information from
snitches, and interpreting forensic evidence. If the po
lice or prosecutors believe that they already know who
the criminal is, the purpose of these procedures is not

to find anything out but instead to produce evidence
that will convince a judge and jury. Reforms designed
to protect the innocent will seem misguided to law
enforcement officials who use these procedures not
to discover the criminal but to build a case that will
convict him. If they see the reforms as obstacles to
convicting the guilty, they are likely to resist them or
try to circumvent their effects.
GENERATING FALSE NEGATIVES

A false positive is the inclusion of an object in a cat
egory where it does not belong: diagnosing a healthy
person as depressed or diabetic, for example. A false
negative is the exclusion of an object from a category
where it does belong: diagnosing a depressed or dia
betic person as healthy. In any classification system
there is a tradeoff between false positives and false
negatives. Procedures that reduce one type of error
often increase the other. If there are twelve major
symptoms of depression-insomnia, loss of interest,
suicidal tendencies, and so on-a doctor who diag
noses a patient as depressed if she shows any one of
the symptoms will mistakenly include many people
who are not depressed: there will be too many false
positives. A doctor who requires that a patient exhibit
all twelve symptoms before prescribing treatment will
mistakenly miss many people who are seriously de
pressed: there will be too many false negatives.
Those who seek to reduce wrongful convictions
false positives-must recognize that the same reforms
might also reduce the number of convictions of sus
pects who are actually guilty. Misleading a suspect into
believing that he has been identified by an eyewitness
may cause an innocent person to make a false confes
sion, but at least as often it may cause a guilty person
to give up and confess the truth, thereby increasing
the probability of an accurate conviction. Many of the
proposed reforms may make all convictions more dif
ficult to accomplish, not just convictions of innocent
people.
Some innovations increase the identification of
the innocent without diminishing the identification
of the guilty-scientifically conducted DNA analysis
is the shining example-but for most there is likely
to be a tradeoff. Not even the excellent safeguards
against suggestive lineup procedures proposed by
the American Psychology-Law Society (Wells et al.,
1998) are immune from this problem. These recom
mendations include blind lineups, informing the wit
ness that the culprit might not be there, and fairly
constructed lineups. But they could cause a hesitant
but accurate witness to fail to identify a suspect, even
though the same witness might have made the identi
fication if suggestive procedures had been employed.
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For a few reforms, such as sequential lineups (Wells,
2006), preliminary evidence indicates that the likeli
hood of increasing false negatives is small, but so far
there is little research.
There are many policy reasons to forbid sugges
tive identification practices, but we cannot assume
that an unbiased procedure always leads to the right
result. If the police actually do know who commit
ted the crime and can get a witness to identify the
person, the resulting conviction is a true conviction.
Videotaping interrogations and lineups is also an ex
cellent idea, but not foolproof an aggressive defense
attorney may find pieces of the tape that would shake
the jury's confidence in the result, whether or not that
result is accurate. These reforms are important, and
we endorse them, but they are not cost free.
The adversary system exacerbates this problem.
Good defense lawyers will exploit any weaknesses or
irregularities in the prosecution to cast doubt on the
guilt of the truly guilty : their job is to generate false
negatives, as the prosecutors well know. Witnesses
shown a blind, unbiased lineup may be less confident
than witnesses shown a biased lineup, may express un
certainty, or may not identify anyone at all. The de
fense attorney will make the most of these weaknesses,
emphasizing the witness's failure to make a confident
identification. The same is true for other reforms de
signed to minimize false convictions: the defense will
use them to cast doubt on the guilt of all defendants.
Most police and prosecutors prefer to keep their in
vestigations confidential and resist reform efforts be
cause they may provide ammunition to the defense.
An adversary system is a contest, and the search for
truth is often eclipsed by the desire to win.

Policy Implications
Basic Issues

The most dramatic development in the provision of
intensive medical care in the past ten years is prob
ably the use of checklists. The best known is a simple
form that requires doctors to note that they have
taken several time-honored steps to prevent infections
when inserting bloodstream catheters: wash hands,
clean patient's skin with disinfectant, cover patient
with sterile drapes, and so forth. In a pilot project in
Michigan hospitals in 2004 and 2005, the use of this
checklist decreased the rate of infection by 66% over 3
months; in 18 months it saved $75 million and more
than 1,500 lives (Pronovost et al., 2006). It seems
that the best way to prevent bloodstream infections in
intensive care units is not a new drug or better equip
ment but a procedure that greatly increases the odds
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that doctors and nurses will do what they are already
supposed to do.
Almost every reform we suggest is some version
of trying to get police, prosecutors, and defense at
torneys to do what they are already supposed to do.
But doing that effectively is far more difficult for false
convictions than for infections. For one thing, we are
crippled by our ignorance. We know that checklists
reduce deaths in hospitals because we can observe
that outcome directly and compare mortality rates
across different treatment regimes, but (by definition)
we never recognize false convictions when they occur,
and we only occasionally discover them later on. For
example, we have no idea how many innocent de
fendants plead guilty or which ones do so and under
what circumstances, so we are unlikely to identify the
variables that matter. And we cannot learn much from
field experiments. We might test a plausible technique
for reducing false guilty pleas, but since we still will
not be able to tell which defendants are guilty and in
nocent, we will not know whether it works.
The fundamental reason for our pervasive ig
norance is that guilt is a classification based on im
perfect information. Classifications can be wrong in
more ways than one. As we have noted, reforms that
reduce false positives-convicting the innocent
may increase false negatives-failing to convict the
guilty. As usual in this area, we can only guess at the
effects of this tradeoff, but the adversarial nature of
criminal litigation makes it much more complicated.
Everybody in an intensive-care unit-doctor, nurse,
or technician-has the same objectives: the survival
and health of the patient. In court, the defendant and
his lawyer do what they can to undermine the work
of the prosecutor and the police-to get a dismissal
or an acquittal-whether the defendant is innocent
or guilty.
And then there is the question of cost. The
American medical system is famously well funded.
It accounts for 16% of our gross domestic product.
There are, of course, huge problems of inefficiency,
lack of access, and uneven distribution of medical ser
vices, but they occur in an overall context of adequate,
if not excessive, funding. The criminal justice system
is starved. Few cases get anything like the attention
they deserve. A plausible reform, like providing tri
als to 25% of felony defendants, is unattainable, and
even basic good practice-for example, collecting and
preserving all physical evidence in all felony cases
cannot be done on existing budgets.9
The Production of Evidence

When the wrong person is arrested, prosecuted, and
convicted, it usually means that the evidence against
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him was defective. The most important kinds of evi
dence for the prosecution are eyewitness testimony
about what was done and who did it; physical evidence
such as fingerprints, DNA, or stolen goods; and con
fessions. Most reforms designed to reduce the num
ber of false convictions involve improving the collec
tion, interpretation, and preservation of these kinds
of evidence. That applies even when the focus seems
to be elsewhere. For example, careful scrutiny of jail
house snitches is important, in large part because they
generally claim to report confessions by defendants,
and pseudoscientific expertise, such as handwriting
analysis, can provide dangerously misleading interpre
tations of critical items of physical evidence.
To maximize the amount of high-quality evidence,
investigations should be scrupulous and thorough,
even when the case against a s�spect already seems
to be convincing. This is most obvious with regard to
physical evidence such as fingerprints, blood, semen,
surveillance tapes, weapons, and other objects related
to the crime. Many physical traces are ephemeral.
Rain obliterates footprints, friends carry off incrimi
nating objects, the scene of the crime is compromised,
and evidence that could throw light on the crime is
irretrievably lost. It is crucial that the initial search be
comprehensive-rather than focused exclusively on
collecting evidence against the identified suspect
and the evidence that is collected should be care
fully preserved for future analysis. If DNA testing of
critical evidence is possible, it should always be done.
Forensic testing should be done in laboratories that
are held to high standards, operate independently
from police departments, and are regularly monitored
( National Research Council, 2009). Unfortunately,
many American crime labs fall far short of this ideal.
All this will cost money, but it would be money well
spent since it would increase the likelihood both of
finding the true criminal in the first place and of dis
covering mistakes after the fact.
The use of DNA identification in rape cases il
lustrates the benefits of careful attention to physical
evidence. Twenty-five years ago, a rape trial in which
the defendant claimed to be misidentified was usually
a battle of credibility: the jury had to decide whose
story to believe, the victim's or the defendant's. Now,
if semen is recovered, DNA testing decides most of
these cases, and they rarely go to trial. And in old
cases, an innocent man serving time for rape may be
exonerated, and the real rapist may be identified, by
comparing the sample to profiles in DNA databases
but only if semen from the crime scene was collected
and preserved. In the years to come, new technolo
gies may extend this scenario to other tests and other
crimes, if the collection and preservation of the physi
cal evidence is conscientious.

In principle, the same logic applies to interroga
tions, eyewitness testimony, and physical evidence
that cannot be tested by means as definitive as DNA
identification. If an interrogation is recorded and the
recording is preserved, it is easier to tell whether the
incriminating facts were provided by the suspect or
by the interrogator. Recording interrogations may re
duce false confessions because the police will be less
likely to coerce or mislead the suspect if they know
that the defense attorney and possibly the judge or
jury will be able to see how the confession was ob
tained. If, later on, new evidence suggests that a de
fendant who was convicted on the basis of a confes
sion might be innocent, the tape can be reviewed in
order to reassess the authenticity of the confession.
In order to eliminate intentional or inadvertent
suggestive police pressure on eyewitnesses, the offi
cer who conducts the lineup should not know which
person is the actual suspect. Several other procedures
that can improve the accuracy of lineup identifications
are currently used by some police departments. First,
the other people in the lineup are chosen on the basis
of the witness's description of the suspect, making
sure that the suspect has no identifying feature that
makes him stand out: a person who did not witness
the crime but who read the witness's initial descrip
tion should not be able to pick out the suspect ( Doob
and Kirschenbaum, 1973). Second, the witness is told
that the criminal may not be in the lineup. Third, as
soon as the witness has made a choice, she is asked
how confident she is about that choice (cf. Wells
et al., 1998) . Fourth, if there are several witnesses,
they are shown the lineup one at a time, with no in
formation about how the others responded. All of
these are good practices, and future technology may
provide further improvements. For example, it may
be possible to create a photo lineup on a laptop soon
after a possible suspect is apprehended and show it to
witnesses while their memories are still fresh.
Finally, as with police interrogations, video record
ing the identification procedures may inhibit police
bias at the time of the identification and will create
a record that can be reviewed in case of later doubts
about its accuracy. Recordings of interrogations and
identifications will rarely provide evidence as strong as
a DNA sample, but they are far better than what we
have now-inconsistent recollections of police, sus
pects, and witnesses.
Like extra care in collecting and preserving physi
cal evidence, these reforms will cost money. There are
other costs as well. A clear DNA match or mismatch
does not raise the problem of false negatives, of letting
guilty people go free. With these less conclusive forms
of evidence, the very tactics that lead to false convic
tions may increase the number of true convictions,
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and preventing the police from using these tactics
will likely reduce the number of true convictions.
Misleading a guilty suspect about the strength of
the evidence against him may induce him to confess.
Directing a witness's attention to the suspect in the
lineup or urging her to make an identification may
give her the confidence to identify the guilty person.
Reporting an ambiguous fingerprint as a clear match
might provide the extra evidence necessary to secure
the conviction of the true criminal.
Recordings of interrogations or lineups may also
provide powerful ammunition for shrewd defense at
torneys, who could peruse them for any irregularities
that may raise questions in the mind of the judge or
jury, even if these irregularities should seem trivial in
the context of the whole procedure. That is an in
evitable consequence of the adversarial system and
probably the major reason that police so often resist
proposed reforms.
Big Cases and Small Cases

Almost all of the false convictions we know about
those that end in exoneration-are big cases: murders
and rapes for which innocent defendants were con
victed at trial and sentenced to death, life imprison
ment, or decades behind bars. A case of this scope
consumes hundreds or thousands of hours of effort
by police officers and lawyers on both sides. Big cases
are fertile ground for confirmation bias: there are
many stages, many pressures, and many opportunities
for investigators to become committed to their theo
ries. Perhaps as a result, these cases also frequently in
volve serious misconduct by the attorneys or the offi
cers involved. The most common type of government
misconduct that we know about is the suppression of
exculpatory evidence (Armstrong and Possley, 1999),
but some cases include perjury by police officers ( for
example, forensic analysts), procuring perjury by civil
ian witnesses, and planting physical evidence ( Gross
et al., 2005). When such misconduct is discovered,
it is rarely punished (Ridolfi, 2007). On the defense
side, the main failing is incompetence-lawyers who
do nothing to prepare for trial, never talk to their cli
ents, or ignore alibi witnesses and exculpatory physical
evidence. Here, too, the rules are unenforced (Possley
and Seargeant, 2011) Even egregious neglect rarely
results in reversals of convictions or sanctions against
the offending lawyer.
Addressing the problems of big cases is compara
tively straightforward, at least in the abstract. They are
already time-consuming, uncommon, expensive en
terprises, and it would not take much more time and
money to do things right. Government misconduct
and incompetent defense should not be tolerated.10 It
.
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would not take a substantial increase in resources to
collect and preserve physical evidence, conduct care
ful identification procedures, record interrogations,
or conduct systematic internal review within prosecu
tion and police agencies to identify investigative errors
before trial. O'Brien ( 2009) found that confirmation
bias was greatly reduced if the subjects were asked to
list evidence against, as well as in favor of, their theory
of the case. Perhaps some version of that procedure
would reduce false convictions, or a prosecutor or a
police officer with no other role in the investigation
could review the case as a devil's advocate, looking for
unexplored theories and evidence of possible errors
(see also Findley and Scott, 2006).
The overwhelming majority of all criminal con
victions, however, are comparatively small, routine
cases: guilty pleas after cursory investigations. In the
usual case, nobody-neither the defense nor the pros
ecution, and certainly not the court-collects any
evidence once charges have been filed; as a practical
matter, the initial police report, however sketchy,
forms the only factual basis for a negotiated plea
bargain. Some of these cases may involve affirmative
misconduct-perjury, intimidation, concealing excul
patory evidence-but the nearly universal problem is
simply inattention. An innocent defendant in a small
case is likely to have two unattractive choices: take a
bargain and plead guilty or hold out for trial, perhaps
in pretrial custody, and hope that by then someone
will come up with evidence of his innocence.
Inevitably, most false convictions happen in small
cases, but we very rarely spot them. A global reform
of plea bargaining in ordinary cases-for example, re
quiring an independent factual investigation by the
defense attorney-would involve a basic restructuring
of the system of criminal litigation and a huge infusion
of money. Some reform of this sort might be worth
the cost, but it is unlikely to happen in the foresee
able future and we do not know enough about false
convictions in run-of-the-mill cases to know what
sort of change is most likely to help. Eliminating plea
bargaining entirely and providing trials to all or most
defendants is out of reach, and there is no reason to
believe that doing so would improve the accuracy of
convictions. The alternative to a guilty plea is usually
a trial, and the main reason that innocent defendants
plead guilty is fear that they might be convicted at
trial and receive much longer sentences. In most cases
that fear is probably justified. For example, of the 35
defendants in the Tulia mass exoneration, 8 went to
trial, were convicted of drug dealing, and received
sentences that averaged nearly 47 years and ranged up
to life imprisonment. The other 27 Tulia defendants
pied guilty: 1 was not sentenced, 11 received some
combination of probationary terms and fines, and 15

176

•

THE JUSTICE SYSTEM

were sentenced to terms that averaged about 7 years
( Gross, 2008).
Our only suggestion for preventing false convictions
in comparatively small criminal cases is the most basic
and amorphous: those who handle such cases should
remain alert to the possibility that the defendant might
be innocent. This applies to everyone, from police offi
cers to judges, but it is especially important for defense
attorneys, who have unlimited access to the defendants
and whose job it is to protect them.

Conclusion
This chapter began with a famous quotation from
Judge Learned Hand. As we conclude, it may be in
structive to read it again, but in the context in which
it was written ( United States v. Garsson, 1923). The
question before the court was whether the defendant
was entitled to see the evidence considered by the
grand jury that indicted him. Judge Hand held that
he was not:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has
every advantage. While the prosecution is held
rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the
barest outline of his defense. He is immune from
question or comment on his silence; he cannot be
convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the
minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition
he should in advance have the whole evidence
against him to pick over at his leisure, and make
his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able
to see. No doubt grand juries err and indictments
are calamities to honest men, but we must work
with human beings and we can correct such er
rors only at too large a price. Our dangers do not
lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our
procedure has been always haunted by the ghost
of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal
dream. What we need to fear is the archaic for
malism and the watery sentiment that obstructs,
delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime.
In short, procedures that help criminal defendants
are far more likely to obstruct the conviction of the
guilty than to protect the innocent. On the specific
issue that Judge Hand decided, his argument is un
convincing. In most states, grand jury records are now
routinely turned over to defendants, along with many
other types of prosecutorial evidence, with no appar
ent harm. But the fear that Hand expressed remains a
basic argument against many possible reforms.
Sometimes ( as with grand jury records) this re
action is nothing more than anxiety about change.
Many police chiefs, for example, complain in advance
that if they are required to record all station-house

interrogations, there will be a steep drop off in con
fessions and convictions; but in jurisdictions where
this rule is implemented, the police soon switch sides
and become advocates for recording (Sullivan, 2004).
On other issues the problem is more complicated.
In theory, we guarantee every indigent criminal
defendant an effective legal defense at state expense.
But if we actually provided high-quality defense in
every case (and we do not, not nearly), it would be
harder to get convictions. Defense lawyers who actu
ally investigate their cases will spot some false charges,
but more often they will make the state work harder
to convict the guilty. The state may have to find more
evidence, do more legal work, and perhaps take more
cases to trial rather than resolve them with guilty
pleas. Even if the defense attorneys do not succeed in
getting acquittals or dismissals for their guilty clients,
the prosecutors and the police will have less time to
pursue other criminals. That is Judge Hand's basic
complaint.
Extreme versions of this argument are ugly. It
may be cheap to convict defendants by manufactur
ing perjured evidence, or there may be no other way
to nail a murderer you know is guilty, but nobody
advocates perjury as a policy. On more mundane is
sues, however-conducting thorough investigations,
providing effective defense attorneys, disclosing evi
dence that is unfavorable to the state, there is a serious
problem. Our criminal justice system cannot possibly
function as the rules say it is supposed to with the
funds that we provide. Instead, we take shortcuts, of
which the most common is plea bargaining, which pa
pers over all holes in the work that precedes the guilty
plea. If we actually require our public servants to do
careful work, many fewer crimes will be prosecuted,
unless we also greatly increase their budgets. Police
and prosecutors must be forgiven for not believing
that any increase in the work demanded of them will
be matched by an increase in funding.
There are more than a million felony convictions a
year in the United States, mostly for property or drug
offenses, and millions of misdemeanor convictions.
The sentences most defendants receive are compara
tively light, but only comparatively. A year in jail is a
harsh punishment by ordinary standards, and arrest,
pretrial detention, and criminal conviction are severe
punishments in themselves even if there is no post
trial incarceration. The laboratory research on factors
that increase or decrease false convictions is irrelevant
to most of these cases. There is often no eyewitness
other than the arresting officer, no lineup, no formal
interrogation. In some small cases the suspect is in
nocent, but our knowledge is so limited that we can
offer little in the way of recommendation except to
say that the problem of false convictions in this con
text is potentially very serious and deserves research.

FALSE CONVICTIONS

Our main suggestion is distressingly vague: everyone
involved in processing such routine criminals should
be on the lookout for cases of possible innocence.
For major crimes, especially the murders and rapes
that dominate known exonerations, we have men
tioned a variety of possible reforms throughout this
chapter. Most are costly, but we believe that they are
worth the money. We will not achieve accuracy, either
in identifying and convicting criminals or in protect
ing innocent suspects, by continuing to give in to our
penchant for handling criminal investigations and
prosecutions on the cheap.
In a world of adequate funding, we would simply
say that the police and the lawyers should do what
they are supposed to do and follow the practices we
and others recommend. In the system that exists, we
need to set priorities. We see two, and they bracket
the criminal process:
First, if the initial investigation by the police is
careless or incomplete, information is lost forever.
Physical evidence that is lost or destroyed cannot be
replaced. An interrogation that is not recorded cannot
be reconstructed. Eyewitness memory that is altered
by a suggestive lineup or suggestive questioning can
not be retrieved. All of these steps happen before any
defense investigation can possibly begin. That means
that the state has a critical responsibility to collect and
preserve physical evidence, record interrogations, and
conduct and record careful nonsuggestive eyewitness
identifications.
Second, we should be less rigid about reopening
criminal cases after conviction. No legal system can
function if court judgments are subject to open-ended
review, but that principle has limits. It is uncommon
for substantial evidence of innocence to emerge after
conviction, but when that happens, there is a real
possibility that the defendant is innocent. The most
efficient way to limit the harm caused by convict
ing the innocent is to reconsider convictions with an
open mind when new evidence calls them into doubt,
rather than reject the possibility because it is too late.
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reduced charges in order to obtain freedom. For example, in
1978 Terry Harrington and Curtis McGhee were convicted
of murder in Iowa. In 2003, twenty-five years later, the Iowa
Supreme Court reversed the convictions because the police
had concealed evidence about another suspect. By then all
the key prosecution witnesses had recanted their testimony.
Both defendants were offered a deal: plead guilty to second
degree murder and go free. Harrington turned down the
deal, and charges were later dismissed after the state's star
witness recanted once more; he was exonerated. NkGhee
decided to play it safe, took the deal, and was released. He
does not count as exonerated since the final outcome of his
case was a conviction, even though he is just as likely to be
innocent as his codefendant (Gross et al., 200 5) .
4 . Some researchers have attempted t o estimate the rate
of false convictions indirectly. Huff et al. ( 1996) surveyed
officials who work in the criminal justice system and report
that the great majority believe that wrongful convictions
are rare-in the range of 1%. As Gross and O'Brien (2008 )
pointed out, that estimate is just collective guess work-and
self-serving optimism to boot. Poveda (200 1 ) tried to bal
ance Huff's low estimate with data from surveys of prisoners,
about 1 5 % of whom claim to be innocent, but two unreliable
and biased estimates are no better than one. Other research
ers have used statistical models that build on the frequency
of disagreements on verdicts between trial judges and juries,
as reflected in surveys of criminal trial judges, to estimate
that up to 10% of criminal convictions in jury trials are erro
neous ( Gastwirth and Sinclair, 1998; Spencer, 2007) . These
models, however, do not.
5. As Gross and O'Brien (2008) pointed out, most
death-sentenced inmates are removed from death row and
resentenced to life imprisonment, frequently within a few
years of conviction, after which they are unlikely to receive
the extraordinary attention and scrutiny that are devoted to
reinvestigating and reviewing the cases of prisoners who may
be put to death. And, of course, some false convictions must
remain undetected even for defendants who are executed or
die on death row from other causes.
6. A defendant who pleads guilty may also have the right
to appeal, but the appeal is usually limited to procedural is
sues that concern the entry of the guilty plea or the legality
of the sentence.

Notes

7. The effect of appellate review may be much greater
among capital cases, where the rate of reversal of death sen

1. The case of Gary Dodson, who was exonerated in

tences, if not the underlying convictions, is far higher than

Illinois in August 1989 (Connors et al., 1996), is sometimes

the reversal rate for any other category of criminal judg

mistakenly described as the first DNA exoneration in the

ments (Liebman et al., 2000) . If judges are more likely to

United States (e.g., Gross et al., 2005 ) .

reverse death sentences when they think the defendant may

2 . Unless we specify that we are discussing mass exonera

be innocent-and there is strong anecdotal evidence to that

tions, we use the term exoneration to refer to cases of inno

effect-this would mean that most innocent capital defen

cent defendants who were released as a result of proceedings

dants are removed from death row for procedural reasons

that affected only their individual cases.

even if they are not exonerated.

3. Our definition of exoneration also excludes known

8. We are aware of a couple of recent attempts to open

defendants who are almost certainly innocent but who have

the process of factual review in adversarial systems of liti

not been exo nerated-frequently because they pled guilty to

gation but have insufficient information to evaluate their
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efficacy: ( 1 ) In 1997, Great Britain, which has an adversar

studies in the use of DNA evidence to establish inno

ial common-law system that is similar in many respects to

cence after trial (NCJ 1 6 1 2 5 8 ) . Washington, DC :

that in the United States, created a Criminal Cases Review

U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of

Commission, which has the power to investigate complaints

Justice.

by prisoners that they were wrongfully convicted and to refer

Criminal Cases Review Commission. (2009). Annual Re

claims it deems meritorious to the appellate courts. In its

port and Accounts 2008/09. London: The Stationery

first ten years, the courts took action on 3 1 3 referrals from

Office. Retrieved from http ://www.ccrc.gov.uk/

the commission and exonerated the defendants in 187 cases,

CCRC_Uploads/ANNUAL_REPORT_AND_

68% of those referred (Criminal Cases Review Commission,
2009 ) . (2) In 2007, the State of North Carolina created an

ACCOUNTS_2008_9 .pdf
Damaska, M. R. ( 1986). Thefaces ofjustice and state au

Innocence Inquiry Commission that has some of the fea

thority. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

tures of the British Criminal Cases Review Commission

Davis, T. Y. ( 1982). Affirmed: A study of criminal appeals

(North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, 2009 ) .
9 . The federal government i s an exception. The federal
criminal justice system is far better financed than the state
systems, from investigative agencies and prosecutors through
defense attorneys and courts. There are very few exonera
tions in federal cases, which might in part reflect the impact

and decision-making norms in a California court of
appeal. American Bar Foundation Research Journal,

7, 543-64 8 .
Death Penalty Information Center. (2009 ) . Innocence and
the death penalty. Retrieved from http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty

of better funding, but federal cases differ sharply from state

Doob, A. N., and Kirschenbaum, H. ( 1973 ) . Bias in police

cases in many other respects as well. For example, federal

lineups-Partial remembering. Journal of Police

cases account for about 6% of felony convictions and about
1 2 . 5 % of prison inmates, but only about 1 .7% of convicted
murderers are in federal prisons, and murder cases account
for the majority of all exonerations in the past 30 years.
1 0 . Part of the reason for lax enforcement of the profes
sional rules against prosecutorial misconduct and defense at

Science and Administration, 1, 287-293 .
Drizin, S . A . , and Leo, R . (2004). The problem o f false
confessions in the post-DNA world. North Carolina

Law Review, 82( 3 ) , 891-1007.
Durose, M. R. , and Langan, P. A. (2003). Felony sentences

in state courts, 2000 (NCJ 19882 1 ) . Washington,

torney incompetence is the belief by courts and disciplinary

DC: U.S . Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice

authorities that defendants are guilty, so no harm, no foul.

Statistics.

The defendants usually are guilty, but that is no justification

---.

(2004). Felony sentences in state courts, 2002 (NCJ

for ignoring constitutional requirements and rules of profes

2069 1 6 ) . Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

sional conduct. One way or the other, enforcing these rules

Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

cannot depend on discovering miscarriages of justice. Most
are never detected, and even when they are, the time lag is so
long that the offending attorney has probably forgotten all
about it, or has retired, or died-or become a judge.

(2007). Felony sentences in state courts, 2004 (NCJ
2 1 5 646). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Findley, K. A., and Scott, M. S . (2006). The multiple di
mensions of tunnel vision in criminal cases. Wisconsin

Law Review, 2, 291-397.

References

Frank, J., and Frank, B . ( 1957). Notguilty. Garden City,

Armstrong, K., and Passley, M. ( 1 999, January 10-14).

Frisbie, T., and Garrett, R. (2005). Victims ofjustice revis

N.Y.: Doubleday.
Trial and error. How prosecutors sacrifice justice to
win. Chicago Tribune.
Bedau, H. A., and Radelet, M. L. ( 1987). Miscarriages
of justice in potentially capital cases. Stanford Law

Review, 40, 21-179.
Borchard, E. M . ( 1932 ). Convicting the innocent: Errors of

criminal justice. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Cohen, T. H . , and Reeves, B. A. (2006). Felony defen

dants in large urban counties, 2002 (NCJ 2 1 0 8 1 8 ) .
Washington, D C : U . S . Department of Justice, Bureau
of Justice Statistics.
Connery, D. ( 1977) . Guilty until proven innocent. New
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
Connors, E., Lundgren, T., Miller, N., and McEwen, T.
( 1996 ) . Convicted by juries, exonerated by science: Case

ited. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Fuller, L. ( 19 6 1 ) . The adversary system. In H. Berman
( Ed . ) , Talks on American law (pp. 1 0-22 ) . New York:
Vintage Books.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 ( 1 972 ) .
Gardner, E. S . ( 19 5 2 ) . The court of last resort. New York:
William Sloane Associates.
Garrett, B. (2008 ) . Judging innocence. Columbia Law

Review, 108, 55-142.
Garrett, B . , and Neufeld, P. (2009). Invalid forensic science
testimony and wrongful convictions. Virginia Law

Review, 95, 1-97.
Gastwirth, J. L., and Sinclair, M. D. ( 1998 ) . Diagnostic test
methodology in the design and analysis of judge-jury
agreement studies, Jurimetrics, 39, 59-78 .

FALSE CONVICTIONS

Givelber, D. (20 0 1 ) . The adversary system and historical
accuracy: Can we do better/ In S. D. Westervelt and
J. A. Humphrey (Eds.), Wrongly convicted: Perspec

tives on failed justice (pp. 2 5 3-26 8 ) . Piscataway, NJ:
Rutgers University Press.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 1 5 3 ( 1976 ) .
Gross, S . R . ( 1 987). Loss o f innocence: Eyewitness identi
fication and proof of guilt. Journal ofLegal Studies,
16, 395-45 3 .
---

. ( 1998 ) . Lost lives: miscarriages o fjustice in capi

tal cases. Law and Contemporary Problems, 61(4),
125-1 52.
---. (2008 ) . Convicting the innocent. Annual Review

of Law and Social Science, 4, 173-92.
Gross, S. R., Jacoby, K., Matheson, D. J., Montgomery,
N., and Patil, S. (200 5 ) . Exonerations in the United
States 1989 through 2003. Journal of Criminal Law

and Criminology, 95, 523-560.
Gross, S . L., and O 'Brien, B . (200 8 ) . Frequency and pre
dictors of false conviction: Why we know so little, and
new data on capital cases. journal of Empirical Legal

Studies, 5, 927-962.
Heron, M. (2007). Deaths: Leading causes for 2004.

National Vital Statistics Reports, 56( 5 ) , 1-96.
Hoffman, M. (2007, April 26). The 'innocence' myth.

Wall Street Journal, p. Al9.
Huff, C. R., Rattner, A., and Sagarin, E. ( 1996) . Convicted

but innocent: Wrongful conviction and public policy.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Innocence Project. (2009). Know the cases. Retrieved from
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/Browse
Profiles.php
Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2 5 1 6 (June 26, 2006).
Kassin, S. (2005 ) . On the psychology of confessions:
Does innocence put innocents at risk? American

Psychologist, 60, 2 1 5-228 .
(2008 ) . False confessions: Causes, consequences,
and implications for reform. Current Directions in

Psychological Science, 17, 249-2 5 3 .
Leo, R . (200 8 ) . Police interrogation and American justice.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Leo, R. A. (2009 ) . False confessions: Causes, consequences,

•

179

convicted: Perspectives on failed justice (pp. 2 5 3-26 8 ) .
Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Mathieson, A., and Gross, S. R. (2004 ). Review for error.

Law, Probability and Risk, 2, 259-268.
McGonigle, S., and Emily, J. (2008, October 10). 1 8
Dallas County cases overturned b y DNA relied heavily
on eyewitness testimony. Dallas Morning News.
Meissner, C . A., and Brigham, J. C. (200 1 ) . Thirty years
of investigating own-race bias in memory for faces: A
meta-analysis. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 7,
3-3 5 .
National Research Council. (2009 ) . Strengthening forensic

science in the United States: A path forward. Washing
ton D. C . : The National Academy Press.
Nickerson, R. S. ( 1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous
phenomenon in many guises. Review of General

Psychology, 2, 175-220.
North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission (2009 ) .
Retrieved from http://www.innocencecommission-nc
.gov/
O 'Brien, B. (2009). A Recipe for bias: An empirical look
at the interplay between institutional incentives and
bounded rationality in prosecutorial decision making.

Missouri Law Review, 74, 999-1 0 50 .
PBS . (2004, June 1 7 ) . The Plea. Frontline. Retrieved from
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
plea/four/stewart.html
Pennington, N., and Hastie, R ( 1992 ) . Explaining the
evidence: Tests of the story model for juror decision
making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
62, 189-206.
Possley, M., and Seargeant, J. ( 20 1 1 ) . Preventable error:
Prosecutorial misconduct in California 2010. North
ern California Innocence Project. A Veritas Initiative
Report. Retrieved from http://www.veritasinitiative
.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Prosecutorial
Misconduct_FirstAnnual_Final8 . pdf
Poveda, T. G. (2001 ). Estimating wrongful convictions.

Justice Quarterly, 18( 3 ) , 698-70 8 .
Pronovost, P. , Needham, D . , Berenholtz, S . , Sinopoli, D . ,
Chu, H . , Cosgrove, S . , e t al. (2006) . An intervention
to decrease catheter-related bloodstream infections

and implications. Journal of the American Academy of

in the ICU. New England Journal ofMedicine, 355,

Psychiatry and the Law, 37( 3 ) , 332-343.

2725-2732. Retrieved from http://content.nejm.

Liebman, J. S., Fagan, J., and West, V. (2000 ) . A broken
system: Error rates in capital cases, 1973-1995.
Retrieved from http://www2 .law.columbia.edu/
instructionalservices/liebman/
Liptak, A. (2008, March 2 5 ) . Consensus on counting the
innocent: We can't. New York Times. Retrieved from

org/cgi/content/full/3 5 5/26/2725
Radelet, M. L., Bedau, H. A., and Putnam, C. ( 1992 ) . In

spite ofinnocence. Boston: Northeastern University
Press.
Radin, E. D. ( 1964). The innocents. New York: Morrow.
Ridolfi, K. (2007 ) . Prosecutorial misconduct: A systematic

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03 /25/us/25bar

review. Preliminary Report prepared for the California

. html

Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice .

Lofquist, W. S. (2001 ) . Whodunit? An examination of

Risinger, D. M. (2007). Innocents convicted: An empiri

the production ofwrongful convictions. In S. D.

cally justified factual wrongful conviction rate. Journal

Westervelt and J. A. Humphrey (Eds.), Wrongly

of Criminal Law and Criminology, 97, 761-806.

180

•

THE JUSTICE SYSTEM

Ross, L. D. , and Nisbett, R. ( 1 99 1 ) The person and the

Warden, R. (2004). The snitch system. Chicago: North

situation. New York: McGraw Hill College.

western School of Law, Center on Wrongful Convic

Scalia, J. (200 1 ) . Federal criminal appeals, 1999, with

tions. Retrieved from http://www.law.northwestern

trends 1 985-99 (NCJ 1 8 5 0 5 5 ) . Washington, DC:

. edu/wrongfulconvictions/issues/causesandremedies/

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice

snitches/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf

Statistics.

Wells, G. L. ( 1 978 ) . Applied eyewitness testimony variables:

Scheck, B . , Neufeld, P., and Dwyer, J. (200 3 ) . Actual in

nocence: When justicegoes wrong and how to make it
right. New York: Signet.

System variables and estimator variables. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 3 6, 1 546-1 5 5 7 .
---

Schlup v. Delo, 5 1 3 U.S. 298 ( 199 5 ) .
Spencer, B . D . (2007). Estimating the accuracy o fjury ver
dicts, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 4, 305-329.
Strier, F. ( 1996 ) . Making jury trials more truthful.

University of California at Davis Law Review, 30,
142-1 5 1 .

. (2006). Does the sequential lineup reduce accurate

identification in addition to reducing mistaken iden
tification? Retrieved from www.psychology.iastate.
edu/faculty/gwells/SequentialNotesonlossofhits.htm
Wells, G. L., and Bradfield, A. L. ( 1998 ) "Good, you iden
tified the suspect": Feedback to eyewitnesses distorts
their reports of the witnessing experience. Journal of

Sullivan, T. P. (2004 ) . Police experiences with recording

custodial interrogations. Report presented by North

Applied .Psychology, 83, 360-376.
Wells, G. L., Lindsay, R. C., and Ferguson, T. J. ( 1979).

western School of Law, Center on Wrongful

Accuracy, confidence, and juror perceptions in eyewit

Convictions. Retrieved from http://www.jenner.com/

ness identification. Journal ofApplied Psychology,

system/assets/publications/7965 /original/CWC_
article_with_Index.final.pdf? 1 324498948
Tavris, C . , and Aronson, E. (2007). Mistakes were made

(but not by me). New York: Harcourt.
Thibaut, J., and Walker, L. ( 1975 ) Procedural justice: A
.

psychological analysis. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
United States v. Garsson 291 F. 646 (L. Hand J. ) ( 1923 ) .
Vaughan, D . ( 1996 ) . The Challenger launch decision.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

64(4), 440-44 8 . doi: l 0. 1037/002 1 -9 0 10 . 64.4.440
Wells, G. L., Small, M., Penrod, S., Malpass, R. S., Fulero,
S. M. , and Brionacombe, C.A.E. ( 1 998 ) . Eyewitness
identification procedures: Recommendations for line
ups and photospreads, Law and Human Behanvior,

22, 603-647.
Wells, T., and Leo, R. A. (2008 ) . The wrongguys: murder,

false confessions and the Norfolk Four. New York: The
New Press.

